Aristotle's enthymeme and nonmonotonic logics by McIntosh, Benjamin David
The Report committee for Benjamin David McIntosh 
 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following report: 
 
 






































Aristotle’s Enthymeme and Nonmonotonic Logics 
 
by 
Benjamin David McIntosh, B.A. 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of the University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 





Aristotle’s Enthymeme and Nonmonotonic Logics 
 
by 
Benjamin David McIntosh, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
SUPERVISOR: Jeffrey Walker 
 
 In this paper I explore the usefulness of nonmonotonic logics within the domain 
of enthymematic reasoning. Nonomonotonic logics are logical systems that do not require 
certain and complete information and allow for fallibilistic or merely plausible reasoning. 
In order to bring the work of contemporary nonmonotonic logical theory into the realm of 
rhetoric, I provide a brief sketch of the history of logic in the twentieth century and argue 
that the hostility between rhetoricians and logicians is in part a result of broad 
misunderstanding. An understanding of contemporary rather than a Fregean, turn-of-the-
twentieth-century metatheory could provide the rhetorician with a useful tool for 
explaining different reasoning patterns in the overlap between logical domains and 
rhetorical situations. After sketching the relationship between nonmonotonic and classical 
logics, I argue that nonmonotonic logics could be useful for modeling the type of 
reasoning Aristotle presents with his conception of the enthymeme. To show the 
rhetorical function of nonmonotonic logics, I examine plausibilistic reasoning in two 
texts: an excerpt on diagnosing chronic cystic disease from L.V. Ackerman’s 1970 
textbook Cancer and an early speech on university education from John Stuart Mill. 
These seemingly incongruent examples are not provided in an effort to show that 
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nonmonotonic logics can account for all instances of rhetorical reasoning but are instead 
provided to show an understanding of logical domains can be useful in radically 
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 In this paper I argue that consistencies between Aristotle’s enthymeme and 
nonmonotonic logics – non-classical logics that allow for fallibilistic or merely plausible 
reasoning – are worth exploring. The world of non-classical logics offers compelling 
possibilities for rhetoricians, even if these possibilities are shrouded in vocabularies of 
analytic philosophy that are seemingly inconsistent or incompatible with those of the 
rhetorician. It is something of a commonplace to point to the quarrel between 
philosophers and rhetoricians, to an agonistic history between two fields with radically 
different epistemological stances. There are endless places to point within this history of 
tension between accounts of logic and rhetoric. Perhaps Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
distinction in The New Rhetoric between argumentation and demonstration is one of the 
more useful. For them, the rhetorician’s reasoning takes the form of argumentation – a 
discursive approach that relies on a series of contingencies and probabilities. In so far as 
there are rules, they act as practical guides for developing an argument, not as arbiters of 
truth. Reasoning for the philosopher-logician takes the form of demonstration. She 
applies a universal model of rationality to the world. If parties disagree, then at least one 
of the demonstrations must be flawed.  
 I would argue that the rhetorician’s understanding of the philosopher-logician has 
changed very little in the nearly sixty years since The New Rhetoric. In that time, some 
have explored anti-empiricist temperament within rhetoric and composition studies 
(Charney 1996; Connors 2000; Haswell 2005) And others have claimed former analytic 
philosophers for rhetoricians when those thinkers turned from their logico-mathematical 
pasts (Rorty 1989, Toulmin 1964). However, there has been very little to update the inter-
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disciplinary understanding that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca sketch. Philosopher-
logicians accuse rhetoricians of sophistry: rhetoric is at best portrayed as a trivial study of 
tricks for clear communication1 and at worst as a rigorless study of manipulation and 
artful lies. Rhetoricians reclaim “sophistry” and contend that contemporary philsopher-
logicians are consistent with a philosophical tradition that has always misrepresented and 
maligned the sophistic tradition: logical theory is at best portrayed as a naïve 
Enlightenment project that has no bearing on real world argumentation or composition 
instruction and at worst as a part of some sort of phallogocentric, undemocratic project 
that, in its misrepresentations of the rhetorical situation, reinforces a hegemonic structure. 
There has been little change to the disciplines’ history of poor collaboration. 
 What follows is an attempt to begin inter-disciplinary communication by way of 
an exploratory venture into the world of contemporary logical theory. The last half 
century’s growth in non-traditional or non-classical logics and pragmatic and pluralistic 
logical metatheory suggests that the philosopher-logician is moving closer to the realm of 
rhetoric (Quine 1950; McDermott & Doyle 1980; Beall and Restall 2000 & 2006). 
Moreover, with the influence of computer science, artificial intelligence, and cognitive 
science, there have been more attempts to descriptively model incomplete and 
inconsistent human reasoning and communication processes. The formal and mechanistic 
world of logical theory is entering areas where the certainty associated with classical 
logics and mathematics is impossible to find. With such changes we see a renewed 
philosophical interest in rationality as located within particular contexts. This requires a 
pluralistic account of logic that allows for multiple rationalities specific to particular 
reasoning situations. Demonstration is seemingly becoming less of a universal, 
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prescriptive arbiter and more of a local, descriptive tool. Unlike a positivist tradition that 
attempted to construct the one true logic, this new approach constructs and uses logics in 
so far as they are productive for modeling particular phenomena. 
 In exploring the relationship between nonmonotonic logics and the Aristotelian 
enthymeme, this paper is not attempting to add to the conversation about Aristotle’s 
enthymeme by showing that it looks like a nonmonotonic logic or a mode of 
nonmonotonic reasoning; it is instead a paper that adds to the conversation about the 
relationship – intellectual and political – between rhetoric and logic by exploring 
potential connections between the enthymeme and formal nonmonotonic reasoning 
systems. This paper is part of a larger argument that non-classical logics have rhetorical 
value that is, at the very least, worth exploring.   
 
Classical & Non-Classical Logics 
 Critical to an understanding of the way that nonmonotonic logics relate to the 
rhetorician’s typical conception of logic is an understanding of the relationship between 
classical and non-classical logics.  “Classical,” in the sense of “classical logics,” does not 
necessarily refer to the classical world of Aristotle but instead refers to a traditional set of 
logical axioms. Before exploring the axiomatic differences between classical and non-
classical logics, it will first be productive to examine differences in logical metatheory – 
philosophical accounts of the roles and properties of logical systems. By examining 
historical shifts in metatheory, we can see how Logic as a discipline has changed since 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s famous description. Looking to such shifts offers the 
rhetorician a different conception of logic, one that sees it as a useful tool for 
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understanding particular domains or discursive situations rather than as a prescriptive 
force that determines acceptable human reasoning. 
 In a work with an argument that parallels my own and to which my argument is 
much indebted, Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen contend that Psychology’s 
rejection of logic is a result of a misunderstanding of what logics do. To make this claim 
they point to the differences between Gottlob Frege’s logical idealism and Edmund 
Husserl’s account of semantics. Both reject logical psychologism, a popular nineteenth 
century account that views logical laws as a presentation of psychological laws. Logical 
psychologism holds that laws should describe empirical human reasoning events. 
However, Husserl and Frege differ in the sources of their rejection. Frege argues that 
logical and mathematical knowledge are objective and necessarily true of the world 
inside or outside of the interiority of psychological phenomena:  
If we could grasp nothing but what is in ourselves, then a [genuine] conflict of 
opinions, [as well as] a reciprocity of understanding, would be impossible, since 
there would be on common ground, and no idea in the psychological sense can be 
such a ground. There would be no logic that can be appealed to as an arbiter in the 
conflict of opinions. (Grungesetze der Arithmetik from Stenning and van 
Lambalgen 10-11) 
 
This notion of logic as the “arbiter in the conflict of opinions” is exactly the sort 
objective, normative account that twentieth century rhetoricians like Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca reject. Husserl distances his account from Frege by separating the 
normative and the mathematical.  
 While Husserl is still presenting a mathematical account of consequence as truth 
preservation, his account shifts from Frege in that, with an account of semantics, he is 
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trying to preserve particular kinds of truth in particular kinds of situations (12). Husserl 
explains: 
The objective correlate of the concept of a possible theory, determined 
exclusively in terms of its form, is the concept of a possible field of knowledge 
over which a theory of this form will preside. [This field] is characterized by the 
fact that its objects are capable of certain relations that fall under certain basic 
laws of such and such a determinate form (Formale und tranzsendenale Logik, 
from Stenning and van Lambalgen 13) 
 
Logical laws are no longer true of the objective world as a whole; they are instead true of 
a semantics that accounts for particular situations. This is a fine point and perhaps not 
especially striking at first glance. However, importantly Husserl is here presenting a 
much more modern account than Frege. By presenting semantics as bases for laws, he 
accounts for logical domains, particular areas where particular logical systems can 
account for formal consequence. Such an account allows us to view logics as descriptive 
tools useful for modeling situations, not as prescriptive tools after which to model 
discursive situations. While Husserl is still interested in presenting an account of logical 
laws that establishes and maintains truth, he is no longer arguing that these laws are 
universally applicable. Instead, they are applicable for semantic systems. Of course, 
Husserl is not a sophist; he clearly does not establish an account of truth that many 
rhetoricians would support. Yet, he does present an account of logical theory that is more 
useful. What is most important here is the shift from objective idealism to semantics. In 
so far as both cling to notions of objectivity and truth, they are deeply problematic; 
however, by insisting on particular semantic structures – particular reasoning situations – 
Husserl opens the door for more pluralistc and descriptive logical metatheories.  
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 Stenning and van Lambalgen contend that the contemporary psychologists’ 
conception of logic relies on a Fregean account and refers almost exclusively to classical 
logics. They explain that logic is classical if it accepts four parameters:  
 1. [syntax] fully recursive language: if ϕ, ψ are formulas then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ→ψ, ϕ 
 ∨ ψ, ϕ  ∧ ψ, ….; 
 2. [semantics] truth-functionality: the truth-value of a sentence is a function of the 
 truth-value of its components only;  
(2’. As a consequence: evaluation of the truth-value can be determined in the 
given model (the semantics is extensional)); 
 3. [semantics] bivalence: sentences are either true or false, with nothing in 
 between; 
 4. [consequence] the Bolzano-Tarski notion of consequence. (25-26) 
 
These require unpacking. First, a sentence is a well-formed formula. Well-formed 
formulas have truth-values. Whether a formula is well-formed depends on the rules of 
particular formal languages. Of course, these rules vary greatly, and the complications of 
such variation are beyond the intended scope of this paper. For my purposes it is best to 
consider formulas simply as the parts that make up sentences. A sentence is necessarily a 
formula, but a formula is not necessarily a sentence.  
 Parameter 1. is simply the claim that if formulas are combined and altered in ways 
consistent with the rules of logical modifiers, those new modifications are also formulas. 
2. and 3. are more interesting for the rhetorician. 2. and 2’. require that the truth values of 
individual parts of a sentence determine the truth value of the sentence. If the sentence ϕ 
is true and the sentence ψ is true, then necessarily the sentence ϕ & ψ is true. This may at 
first seem uninteresting; however, when combined with 3., it becomes clear that these 
parameters make modeling almost all human reasoning impossible. 3. – a variation on 
Aristotle’s law of the excluded middle – will be more familiar to rhetoricians. When this 
is combined with 2., the uncertainty inherent in a sentence like “If it is raining, then my 
 
  7 
students will have rain gear” becomes impossible to model. If the proposition “it is 
raining” can only be true or false, then there is no way to account for middle cases in 
between a sunny day and a monsoon. If there is mist, is the proposition “it is raining” true 
or false? If it is true, would the appearance of a single student dressed in gym clothes 
make our original sentence false? If we classify a student in gym clothes as an instance 
where the proposition “my students will have rain gear” is false, then, given parameters 
2. and 3. the sentence must be false. Classical logics account for uncertainty very poorly. 
This makes them poor models for human reasoning; however, they are useful for 
modeling the sorts of demonstrations made in classical mathematics. 
 
Monotonicity 
 Crucially, classical logics are monotonic: given a set of premises Φ and a set of 
possible conclusions Ψ, as Φ grows Ψ necessarily grows as well.2 This defining feature, 
though formally accurate, does not well communicate the pragmatic work that 
monotonicity does. Monotonic logics are useful for accounting for arguments that move 
in one direction with certainty. Of course, given the rarity (or arguable absence) of certain 
information in natural language argumentation, such logics value as a model for real 
world argumentation is very limited.  
 Growing out of such modeling problems, computer and cognitive scientists and 
artificial intelligence researchers began developing logical systems without monotonicity. 
They described this particular non-classical logic as nonmonotonic. Unlike classical 
logic, nonmonotonic logics allow for non-linear reasoning – reasoning that begins with 
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uncertain, incomplete information and corrects itself when necessary. In their seminal 
paper on the subject McDermott and Doyle explain: 
‘Non-monotonic' logical systems are logics in which the introduction of new 
axioms can invalidate old theorems. Such logics are very important in modeling 
the beliefs of active processes which, acting in the presence of incomplete 
information, must make and subsequently revise assumptions in light of new 
observations. (41) 
 
One may reject a previously asserted conclusion on the basis of a new premise. As such 
only nonmonotonic logics allow a reduction in the number of possible conclusions as the 
number of premises increases. These logics are designed to resemble real world 
reasoning, reasoning drawn from incomplete information. They allow one to move from 
the premise “Jimmy is a bird” to the conclusion “Jimmy flies.” Just as with Aristotle’s 
enthymeme, nonmonotonic logics do not require all of the premises that would be 
necessary for proof in a classical logic. In this instance, one need not state the claim “All 
birds fly” to conclude that Jimmy flies. Though uncertain, the move from “is a bird” to 
“flies” is a default assumption. However, with another premise, with more complete 
information, one could reject the initial conclusion. If one adds the premise “Jimmy is a 
penguin,” one could reject the previous conclusion and instead assert, “Jimmy cannot 
fly.” In this way, nonmonotonic logics provide a means to formalize something not 
unlike Toulmin’s conditions of rebuttal or exception (101).  
 What is perhaps more interesting than these rebuttal or exception mechanisms is 
what these mechanisms allow. Since the system provides a means to revise previously 
held conclusions, it can function as a tool for modeling fallible or plausibilistic reasoning. 
The premises within an argument and the sort of connective tissues binding arguments 
need not be necessary but can instead be plausible or consistent with the appearances of a 
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particular reasoning situation. The difficulty with this sort of logic lies in formalizing the 
communal knowledge on which the reasoner relies. To construct an accurate model of 
plausibilistic reasoning one would need an accurate understanding of a reasoner’s default 
assumptions. This is almost certainly an infinitely complex task; however, it is also a task 
consistent with the rhetorician’s work of engagement with the social, historical, or 




 I would like to turn to two seemingly contradictory passages in Book II of the 
Rhetoric. This contradiction is in no way singular within the text, but it – like many of the 
work’s other contradictions – points to an uncertainty about the role of logic within 
rhetoric. Describing arguments from past fact in II.19 Aristotle claims, “that if the less 
likely of two things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also” (1392.b.15-
16). For instance, to explain the move from a claim about a preceding event to a 
conclusion about a subsequent event Aristotle describes thunder and lightning: “if it has 
lightened, it has also thundered” (1392.b.27). Given that one event cannot occur without 
the other, the probability of lightning and thunder must be exactly the same. Given the 
obvious counterexamples that stem from Aristotle’s claim about the less and more likely 
things, how are we supposed to read these claims? It seems these can only be 
argumentative strategies rather than formal rules of syllogistic reasoning. That is, to argue 
that when the less likely thing occurs the more likely certainly occurs is a method of 
argumentation that appears reasonable. It is a plausible conclusion to draw. Aristotle 
suggests reasonable lines of assumption, not a rule of necessary consequence. The 
reasonable lines of assumption give the rhetor probable lines from which to build an 
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argument. Aristotle explains, “Of all these sequences, some are inevitable and some 
merely usual” (1392.b.32). Some consequences are necessary and others are probable. 
Probable consequences allow for the sort of obvious counterexamples that I have pointed 
to. 
 However, Aristotle also includes II.24 on apparent enthymemes: “Besides 
genuine syllogisms there are syllogisms that appear genuine but are not; and since an 
enthymeme is merely a syllogism of a particular kind, it follows that besides genuine 
syllogisms, there may be those that look genuine but are not” (1400.b.34-38). Why are 
some syllogisms and enthymemes only apparently genuine? This distinction mirrors valid 
and invalid arguments. Jonathan Lear explains that unlike modern logicians who have 
notions of both semantic and syntactic consequence, Aristotle’s syllogistic theory only 
has the notion of syntactic consequence (1-2). Semantic consequence looks to truth-
values to define validity. If a conclusion is always true when the premises are all true, 
then the argument is valid. Syntactic consequence uses a set of rules to explain this 
connection. If all logical rules of consequence are applied appropriately, then an 
argument is valid. Aristotle’s genuine syllogisms are those that follow appropriate rules 
of consequence; however, Aristotle has no means of determining consequence by 
examining truth-values. Aristotle’s syntactic rules are determined by perfect first figure 
syllogisms, those whose truth is self-evident. This syntactic-semantic distinction is 
important because it shows that for Aristotle formal structures are verified by the way 
they match up with rules, not by truth preservation. In the case of the syllogism, these 




 However, Aristotle does not offer this logical explanation to describe the failings 
of the merely apparent enthymemes in Rhetoric. Given that the consequences within an 
enthymeme need only be “usual,” this reduction to first figure, axiomatic truths would be 
impossible. Instead, he offers II.24 – a list of mistakes, common fallacies in reasoning. In 
one example Aristotle claims that one line for apparent enthymemes “is to assert of the 
whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole” (1401.a.24). On 
its surface this seems to be a fairly reasonable rule that Aristotle defends by showing 
where enthymemes with such arguments can go awry. However, in II.19 when describing 
genuine arguments from the possible and impossible Aristotle suggests that we can make 
particular claims relating the whole and the parts: “That where the parts are possible, the 
whole is possible; and where the whole is possible, the parts are usually possible” 
(1391.a.29-31). Given that the parts have the quality of being possible, we can assert this 
of the whole as well. This move from a quality of the parts to a quality of the whole is 
exactly what Aristotle has listed as an apparent enthymeme in II.24, What he originally 
offers as a guide to better arguments becomes a mark of a mistaken argument. This 
contradiction points to the difficulty of drawing formal rules of consequence (rules that 
Aristotle appears anxious to form) when such consequence is only probable or plausible.  
 
Enthymeme within Two Fields 
 Thomas M. Conley attempts to place such problems in perspective by examining 
the use of “enthymeme” before and after Aristotle. He argues that “nowhere outside of 
Aristotle does any notion of enthymeme as syllogistic creature or as stylistic turn play a 
very important part in rhetorical theory” (180). The hyper-logical, syllogistic conception 
  12 
of enthymeme that is dominant outside of rhetorical scholarship is largely a product of 
Aristotle. Lloyd Bitzer writing almost thirty years before Conley suggests that this is the 
dominant definition within logic textbooks. Walton, referring to the term’s usage within 
logic and Artificial Intelligence, writes, “An enthymeme, in current usage, is an argument 
that has one or more premises, or possibly a conclusion, not explicitly stated in the text, 
but that needs to have these propositions explicitly stated to extract the complete 
argument from the text” (2001, 93). Of course, it is largely accepted in rhetorical circles 
that current usage in these fields does not align perfectly with Aristotle’s usage in 
Rhetoric. 
 Conley’s more important claim is that this syllogistic frame is still dominant even 
when rhetoricians reject these purely formal accounts. In turning to Aristotle, they are 
turning to an account of the enthymeme that was at best a minority view. He synthesizes 
prior rhetorical scholarship on the enthymeme, listing six elements consistent with such a 
discussion. Consider Conley’s second and third elements: 
2) One must be careful not to reduce “enthymeme: to a formalist conception. An 
enthymeme is not just a truncated syllogism, i.e., a syllogism with one or more 
parts left unexpressed. 
 3) If an enthymeme should be expressed as a truncated syllogism, it is so 
expressed for practical reasons, not for formal reasons. In general, one should 
elide any premise that would be obvious to one’s audience, or otherwise risk 
insulting their intelligence. (169) 
 
Rhetorical scholars since Bitzer have largely rejected formalist conceptions of the 
enthymeme, but they have still over-relied on the Aristotelian enthymeme and, as a result, 
neglected other accounts that were more prevalent in ancient rhetorical schools. Such 
neglect privileges an account of reasoning and rationality as consistent monotonic 
classical logics. Even if scholars reject accounts that view the enthymeme as merely a 
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truncated syllogism, in forwarding Aristotle’s view they are still connecting its power to 
the power of the syllogism. The enthymeme works because it is very nearly a well-
formed syllogism. 
 Also struggling with current formulations of Aristotelian syllogisms, Walton 
stresses the difference between modern logicians’ notion of enthymeme – as an argument 
with at least one non-explicit premise or conclusion, as an imperfect syllogism – and the 
Aristotelian enthymeme (2001, 97). He points to the Prior Analytics in which Aristotle 
defines the enthymeme as “a deduction starting from probabilities or signs,” a definition 
that gives the reader no sense that the enthymeme requires an implicit premise or 
conclusion (70.a.11). Instead this definition relies on the enthymeme’s ability to engage 
with different modes of truth. In this sense the enthymeme is unique in that it may argue 
within the mode of demonstrative signs or within that of the probable. However, Walton 
does not reduce Aristotle’s concept to this modal definition; instead, he suggests ways 
that we can read Aristotle as offering both the modal definition and the imperfect 
syllogism definition. The audience a rhetor addresses when delivering enthymemes 
accepts the probable as well as the demonstrative; moreover, this audience will not be 
persuaded by long abstract chains of argument. Walton explains, “In rhetorical 
persuasion, it seems that eikotic or plausibilistic3 arguments are frequently combined with 
arguments that have nonexplicit premises or conclusions” (99). Walton, for all his 
willingness to return to Aristotle, shows the difficulty in connecting the rhetorical and 
logical definitions of enthymeme. Even though he provides a means to combine the 
modal and the imperfect definitions, one could still argue that this is a reductive way of 
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interpreting Aristotle. Bitzer criticizes Cope, DeQuincey, and Burney for providing such 
limited accounts (400).  
 
Cancer 
 In an effort to show an area where a binary account of truth is ridiculous, Stenning 
and van Lambalgen cite a passage from L.V. Ackerman’s 1970 medical textbook Cancer. 
I will reproduce this passage and show how an enthymematic reading inspired by theories 
of nonmonotonic reasoning is productive. Rhetoricians require little proof that bivalence 
is absurd; instead, this will be of greater interest as representation of a certain sort of 
knowledge claim.  The 20th century medical text provides an avenue for exploring 
reasoning structures outside of an explicitly argumentative frame. With diagnosis, we see 
an instance where knowledge claims are represented as limited – as only applying often 
rather than constantly – but as highly useful. Both doctors diagnosing and researchers 
suggesting best diagnostic practices, negotiate between useful but broad scientific rules 
and the uncertainty that comes with treating different individual patients. In the act of 
applying such understandings to individual cases, these rules are both supported on the 
whole and undercut in the individual. The act of application is the process of bringing the 
formal and necessary into the concrete and contingent. 
 Ackerman writes: 
Chronic cystic disease is often confused with carcinoma of the breast. It usually 
occurs in parous women with small breasts. It is present most commonly in the 
upper outer quadrant but may occur in other parts and eventually involve the 
entire breast. It is often painful, particularly in the pre-menstrual period, and 
accompanying menstrual disturbances are common. Nipple discharge, usually 
servous, occurs in approximately 15% of the cases, but there are no changes in the 
nipple itself. The lesion is diffuse without sharp demarcation and without fixation 
to the overlapping skin. Multiple cysts are firm, round and fluctuant and may 
transilluminate if they contain a clear fluid. A large cyst in the area of chronic 
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cystic disease feels like a tumour, but is usually smoother and well-delimited. The 
auxillary lymph nodes are usually not enlarged. Chronic cystic disease 
infrequently shows large bluish cysts. More often, the cysts are multiple and 
small. (28)4 
 
 The notion of eikos mentioned above will be productive for this passage. Stenning 
and van Lambalgen note the prevalence of vague and probabilistic language in this 
passage. We should be careful in noting that here probability is not presented in terms of 
a statistical breakdown following careful experimentation or observation; instead, 
probability is presented with respect to the experience of the diagnosing professional. 
That is, rather than defending these claims with scientific studies, Ackerman instead 
presents his claims based on appearances. Consider the third sentence. With the hedging 
phrases “most commonly” and “may,” Ackerman’s confidence in a particular appearance 
is expressed to different degrees. In the former, he expresses the most likely appearance 
but does not expand on its statistical likelihood. In the latter, he explains that another 
appearance is possible if less common. Moreover, phrases like “upper outer quadrant” 
and “entire breast” do not receive careful explanation. There is no technical attempt to 
demarcate quadrants because such an attempt would not be productive. While such a 
technical approach might avoid fuzziness and model better within classical logical 
systems, it would almost certainly be reduced to absurdity when diagnosing physicians 
encounter different bodies.  
 Such vague and probabilistic phrases are consistent with the diagnosing 
physician’s relation to a reasoning system. Classical bivalent logics are rendered absurd 
by the allowances and variations necessary to make claims about an entire population of 
bodies. Also, a mathematical notion of probability is inconsistent with the sorts of claims 
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that Ackerman is here making. This is closer to what Walton refers to as subjective 
probability or plausibility – closer to Aristotle’s notion of eikos (88, 2014). It is a claim 
that is based critically but informally on one’s past experiences rather than on 
constructed, formal experiments or observations that are intended for statistical analysis. 
For instance, the phrase “most commonly” could cover a wide range of quantitative 
probabilities depending on its situation. More importantly, this phrase presents the reader 
with a reasonable procedure for action. While the diagnosing physician cannot be certain 
that a patient has chronic cystic disease merely because of the presence of small lumps in 
the upper outer quadrant of the breast, she does have reason to investigate further. She 
has reason to entertain a productive path of inquiry – reason to make tentative, contingent 
conclusions. We can read “most commonly” as a sign to make just such a tentative 
conclusion, and we can read “may” as a sign of possible alternatives. Throughout this 
passage Ackerman gives the reader signs for diagnosis and then presents alternative less 
common scenarios. He presents his audience with a way of engaging with a particular set 
of appearances.  
 Diagnosis is a matter of experience, of recognizing patterns in a situation where 
information is incomplete yet overabundant. Here Ackerman models this process for his 
audience. He almost certainly has more experience than would the intended audience of 
his textbook; however, he also must assume necessary levels of experience. The 
enthymeme functions as a tool to connect both his own and his audience’s appearances. 
Ackerman does not provide his audience with a complete description of every element of 
diagnosis. He assumes that they have their own experiences and that inform appearances 
they have in diagnosing a patient. Phrases like “upper outer quadrant,” though presented 
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in a sort of scientistic diction, point to such enthymematic reasoning. Ackerman is able to 
avoid the absurdity of a more complete, technical demarcation by relying on his 
audience’s experience, by what they bring to his argument. Moreover, Ackerman’s 
methods for recommending strategies suggest nonmonotonic reasoning. He is suggesting 
potential possibilities, modeling contingent conclusions that can either be maintained or 
discarded with more information. 
Universities 
 In an 1826 speech given at an early meeting of the London Debating Society, the 
young John Stuart Mill argues “the most important quality of the human intellect is its 
progressiveness, its tendency to improvement” (349). He claims that a professorship 
made up of clergymen is counter to progressive thought. Mill, a founding member of the 
debating society, is clearly presenting Enlightenment ideals of knowledge. And more 
importantly, the nineteen-year-old Mill’s rhetorical form of argumentation mirrors its 
content. Within this speech, Mill’s prose is almost conspicuously clear; it seems as 
though he is attempting to argue on stage as if constructing a demonstrative proof, 
presenting his claims in a manner that foregrounds a sort of syllogistic structuring: 
The very idea of progressiveness implies the questioning of all established 
opinions. The  human intellect is only in its right state when everything that is 
believed is believed on evidence. This supposes enquiry. (350) 
 
Mill is setting up the major premise: human beings promote their “right state” – a state 
conducive of progressiveness – only if they promote enquiry. He then moves from an 
abstract major premise to a concrete minor premise: 
The interest of the established clergy requires that the established opinions should 
be believed, but it does not require that they should be believed upon evidence. 
Now our experience of human nature justifies us in affirming that whatever is 
done by a body of men is done in the way that which promises to give least 
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trouble. The least troublesome way of making people believe is to make them 
believe upon trust, and not upon evidence. (350) 
 
Mill presents the minor premise that the clergy does not promote enquiry, and in so doing 
closes the modus tollens argument that the teaching of the clergy does not promote the 
best human state. In doing so he provides syllogistic reasoning to support this minor 
premise (For a full rendering of the way these syllogisms are intertwined see the 
Appendix). All bodies of men act in a way that achieves their goals with greatest ease. 
The clergy is a body of men whose goal is to convince people to believe established 
opinions. Thus, they attempt to foster belief in established opinions in the easiest manner 
possible. It is easier to foster belief through trust than through evidence and enquiry, so it 
would follow that the clergy do not foster belief through evidence and enquiry. And from 
this Mill could conclude that the clergy do not promote progressiveness, humanity’s 
“right state.” However, Mill does not conclude in this way exactly; instead, he claims, 
“That love of ease therefore which is the characteristic of an established clergy is of itself 
sufficient to make them enemies to all enquiry, to improvement, to progression” (350). 
 What is most interesting about this passage is the way that Mill suggests the 
formalism of a syllogism. As Mill is arguing for the importance of inquiry, grounded 
thought, he is performing the action of grounding this thought for his audience. He is 
performing a sort of hyper-logical argument, not unlike Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
quasi-logical arguments. The work as a whole forms a modus tollens syllogism to support 
the claim that clergyman do not promote the right state of man. 21 years before George 
Boole would publish The Mathematical Analysis of Logic and 53 years before Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift, the syllogism would have been the height of formal presentation. Within 
Mill’s larger syllogism, individual premises are themselves supported by syllogistic 
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reasoning – a string of connected intermediary conclusions that generate new premises. 
However, those reading the above paragraph and the below appendix will notice that I 
have done a decent bit of wrangling to force these matter of fact statements into the 
syllogistic form, the form on which Mill insists. Mill suggests the form of logical inquiry 
and in so doing rejects the clergy’s ethos-driven, faith-based appeals both explicitly and 
implicitly, through the form of his appeal. It is as if Mill is just constructing an argument 
out of objective, necessary truths rather than debating in front of an audience. However, 
while rejecting the easy persuasion of the clergy, Mill’s own suasory techniques do not 
appear to live up to his own logos driven standards. The larger modus tollens syllogism 
would conclude that the clergy do not promote the right, progressive human state. In 
presenting this conclusion Mill points to the “ease … characteristic of an established 
clergy” as if this orientation towards ease were specific to clergymen. But those 
following the chain of syllogisms closely will notice that he is only able to work this into 
his argument by claiming that it is a characteristic of groups of men in general, not 
clergymen in particular. That is, men in general have an orientation towards “ease;” by 
Mill’s own argument this orientation is only characteristic of the clergymen in so far as 
they are men, not in so far as they are members of the clergy. In an argument that seems 
to unnecessarily foreground the reasoning process in generally accepted claims (Who 
would question that clergyman often use appeals to trust and faith to convince their 
audience?), Mill has not earned this particular claim, this critique of the clergymen as not 
just unprogressive but also lazy. But because he has convinced the audience to trust his 
method of inquiry, he suggests that this claim is earned. This logical appeal is, of course, 
a rhetorical move.   
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 Importantly, Mill is actively presenting a syllogism, not an enthymeme. He 
carefully provides foundations for every claim, seemingly leaving nothing for his 
audience to add. However, by applying the notion of “ease” the way he does in the 
conclusion, Mill shows that he must rely on his audience to add something. In this case it 
is a sort of anti-religious sentiment that separates the rigor of Enlightenment enquiry and 
demonstration from the “ease” of faith-based persuasion. Presented to an audience 
without this temperament, this argument does not work. This speech, though given in the 
context of a debate, is largely epideictic. Mill, arguing for the rigors of an Enlightenment 
ideal, is in essence preaching to a choir. What is more important for his moves than the 
content he seems to be showing transparently is the presentation of a formalism. That is, 
the appearance of transparency is more important than what he is transparently 
presenting. By performing the formal rigors of a syllogism Mill successfully celebrates 
the Enlightenment epistemological stance of his audience.  
 This move is nonmonotonic in so far as the conclusion that the clergy is 
particularly lazy is a productive step for Mill’s audience. Barring more complete 
information that would directly contradict this claim, Mill and his audience are able to 
move forward from this shared appearance. To apply this claim to the body of men that is 
the clergy and not to the body of men that is the London Debating Society requires a 
nonmonotonic reasoning structure. Mill and his audience are celebrating the rigorous path 
of inquiry and progress. However, Mill claims, “Now our experience of human nature 
justifies us in affirming that whatever is done by a body of men is done in the way that 
which promises to give least trouble.” Such a claim, if applicable to all groups of men 
equally, would run counter to this celebration of rigor. Yet, the very structure of this 
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sentence suggests that its application is limited. It is based on their shared “experience of 
human nature” – that is, it is based on appearances, the as of yet incomplete set of 
information. This sentence is not the claim that all bodies of men take the path of greatest 
ease towards their goals; it is instead the claim that assuming there is nothing unusual 
about a particular body of men, then it takes the path of greatest ease towards their goals. 
Mill must rely on his audience to recognize that “ease” applies to the clergy but does not 
apply to them because they represent something unusual. In the same way that Ackerman 
is suggesting a way of reading particular symptoms, Mill is presenting a way of reading a 
particular appearance of university education. This reading is productive for his and his 
audience’s shared goal – celebrating the Enlightenment project – so it is an acceptable 
conclusion to draw until it proves itself unproductive. 
 
Conclusion 
 Emmanuelle Danblon, in an article that rejects the normative rules like those of 
the informal logics of van Eemeren and Grötendurst, contends that argumentation without 
rhetoric is “nonhuman” in at least two senses: 
 First, it is not human, because it is not realistic, that is, it does not describe actual 
human rationality. Second, it is not humanist because it does not trust that human 
beings have the skills to ground rationality in public debates. Such an idealistic 
viewpoint necessarily grounds its rationality transcendental criteria, that is, 
criteria that are rational because they are “nonhuman.” (496) 
 
In many ways, I have presented a non-humanist account of the relationship between 
rationality and argumentation. Formal nonmonotonic logical systems are clearly not 
rhetorical (They are probably not examples of argumentation either – certainly not in 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s sense of the term.). However, they do provide a new 
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lens through which to view such human rhetorical argumentation. While this notion of 
nonmonotonic reasoning is deeply interested in human rationality and trusts that it may 
ground public debates, that is clearly not its foundation.5 Human reasoning does not take 
the form of a nonmonotonic logic. Instead, these logical systems provide a formal way of 
explaining and modeling the moves of human rationality. They do not explain or describe 
human rationality but rather describe the way that it functions in particular situations. 
While this may be disappointing from a particular humanist perspective, it can also be 
liberating. Logical domains or rhetorical situations need not be interesting just because 
they are human constructions, just because they explain a particular human rationality.6 
Instead, they may be of interest because of the particular situations they describe.  
 Alan Türing’s (in)famous test suggests just such a view of intelligence: his goal 
was not to create a machine that thinks or learns like a human, but rather to create one 
that imitates human reasoning. Rejecting the question of consciousness – of how one 
thinks – is a pragmatic move. It sidesteps difficulties of solipsism or of demarcating the 
human from the non-human. However, unlike the informal logicians or argumentation 
theorists Danblon criticizes, an account of logical pluralism allows one to sidestep 
problems of foundationalism. The arguments’ do not work because they follow the 
universally correct (or at least most advantageous) model of reasoning. They work 
because they work. Particular logics give us a way to recognize the way that they are 
working. A logic is a tool for analyzing the way an argument hangs together, what 
connects a series of claims. It is an explanation of how connective tissues are functioning. 
It is not an arbiter or a metric for determining whether or not an argument will function 
well. It does not abstractly show the way that the world hangs together or, for that matter, 
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make any claims of correspondence to some outside world. With such an approach in 
mind, the question of whether an argument follows a particular logic is not a matter of 
how well an argument works but is instead a matter of how well a particular logic 
describes the way an argument works. Logics present a potential new tool for the 
rhetorician, a tool that describes a facet of human argumentation. In the preceding 
examples, I hope that I have shown how the concept of a nonmonotonic logic is useful 
for describing those arguments. 
 I should be clear. It is not the intention of this paper to inspire rhetoricians to 
unearth yellow legal pads and begin writing formal proofs, to begin examining rhetorical 
situations for applicable models of logic and then formalizing argumentation. This would 
of course be unproductive. What this paper intends to do is to begin an exploration of the 
world of non-classical logics to show that contemporary logics and the study of rhetoric 
are not antithetical, to show that they are in many ways examining similar spaces. 
Moreover, while this paper intends to open doors of potential future scholarship and 
bridge disciplinary gaps, it does not pretend to correct nearly 2500 years of intellectual 
violence. Thus, I am not suggesting that rhetoricians adopt the practices of philosopher-
logicians, nor am I advocating that we forgive those philosopher-logicians who have 
lauded formal rigor over the practical, pedagogical value of the sophists. What I am 
advocating is an examination of new and potentially fruitful ideas of logic in philosophy 
departments. The hard-headed, demonstration-oriented philosopher-logicians are doing 









1 It’s also entirely possible that these logicians do not think of rhetoricians at all because 
they do not realize that the discipline exists in a modern form. 
2 Consider the sets Φ, premises, and Ψ, possible conclusions, with regards to three formal 
arguments. As the set Φ increases, so does the set Ψ. Of course, most of the possible 
conclusions that make up Ψ are trivial. For instance with 2, the addition of ‘R’ only adds 
the tautologous conclusion ‘R.’ 
  1 2 3 
Φ PQ, P PQ, P, R PQ, P, R, ~P 
Ψ PQ, P, Q PQ, P, R, Q PQ, P, R, ~Q, …∞ 
 
 
3 Walton, like Perelman with eulogos, suggests that we should translate eikos as 
“plausible” rather than “probable” because of the latter’s close connection with statistics 
4 Stenning and Van Lambalgen denote “vague expressions” and “qualitiative-
probabilistic adverbs.” Such marking, though not critical to my argument, clearly shows 







upper outer quadrant most commonly 
entire may 
painful often 
menstural disturbance common 
servous usually 
changes approximately 15% of the cases 
diffuse without sharp 
demarcations may 
firm, round and fluctuant if 
clear usually 
large usually 
feels like a tumour infrequently 
smoother and well-delimited More often 
enlarged  
Chronic  
large bluish  
small  
 
5 Of course, even the most formal of systems created by humans has human rationality as 
its base in so far as it is a creation of human rationality.  
6 The move that I am making here is, of course, not dissimilar to that which Frege and 
Husserl make in rejecting logical psychologism. However, unlike Frege and Husserl I am 
not trying to transcend my humanity by articulating an objective account of how the 




– one that need not be measured as valuable by its consistency with the rationality that is 
humanity but rather one that may be useful for modeling human discourse and may also 
be valuable for other forms of intelligence as well. The difference is a matter of 
perspective: one feigns objectivity, the other recognizes situation but also does not 
pretend that the situation is the whole. 
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Appendix: Mill’s Argument 
Mill’s argument presented as a set of syllogisms: 
 Major Premise: If a people promote progressiveness, humanity’s right state, then 
they  promote inquiry. 
 Minor Premise: The clergy does not promote inquiry. 
  [Syllogisms supporting the minor premise: 
Major Premise: All bodies of men act to achieve their goals with 
greatest ease. 
Minor Premise: The clergy is a body of men whose goal is to 
foster belief in established opinions. 
Intermediate conclusion: The clergy will act to foster beliefs in 
established opinions with greatest ease. 
Minor Premise: It is easier to foster beliefs by trust than by 
inquiry. 
Conclusion: The clergy does not promote inquiry.] 
 Conclusion by modus tollens: The clergy does not promote progressiveness, 
humanity’s   right state. 
  
 




B – is a body of men 
2-Place Predicates 
P – promote 
G – has a goal 
A – act to achieve with the greatest ease 
Names 
c – clergy 
f – fostering beliefs in established opinions 
i – inquiry 
p – progressiveness 
t – trust 
 
Short Version 
1. ∀x(Pxp  Pxi)    [For all x, if x promotes progressiveness, then x 
promotes       inquiry] 
2. ~Pci     [It is not the case that the clergy promotes inquiry] 
∴3.  ~Pcp    [Therefore, it is not the case that the clergy   
     promotes progressiveness] 
 
Long Version 
1. ∀x(Pxp  Pxi)   [For all x, if x promotes progressiveness, then x  
     promotes inquiry] 
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2. ∀x∀y((Bx & Gxy)  Axy) [For all x and for all y, if x is a body of men and x  
     has the goal of y, then x acts to achieve y with the  
     greatest ease.] 
3. Bc & Gcf    [The clergy is a body of men, and the clergy has the 
     goal of fostering beliefs in established opinions] 
4. Acf     [The clergy acts to achieve fostering beliefs in 
established       opinions with the greatest ease] 
5. ∀x(Axf  (Pxt & ~Pxi))  [For all x, if x acts to achieve fostering beliefs in  
     established opinions with the greatest ease, the x  
     promotes trust, and it is not the case that x   
     promotes inquiry] 
6. Pct & ~Pci    [The clergy promotes trust, and it is not the case  
     that the clergy promotes inquiry] 
7. ~Pci     [It is not the case that the clergy promotes inquiry] 
∴8.  ~Pcp    [Therefore, it is not the case that the clergy   
     promotes progressiveness] 
 
 Crucially, this argument derives the conclusion that the clergy do not 
progressiveness from the fact that they are a body of men. Because they are a body of 
men, they act to achieve their goals with the greatest of ease, and it is easier to achieve 
their goals by promoting trust than by promoting inquiry. Therefore, they do not promote 
inquiry and hence do not promote progressiveness.  
 However, Mill adjusts this later in his speech and claims that the clergy are a body 
of men particularly interested in acting with the greatest ease. He is adjusting premise 2. 
One could take this as the claim that the clergy are a particularly lazy body of men – this 
seems to be what Mill asks his readers to assume. However, one could also take this as 
the claim that other bodies of men are less interested in achieving the goals only with the 
greatest. With the London Debating Society, Mill is addressing a body of men that he has 
himself assembled. And in such an address he is arguing that the path of rigor and inquiry 
are superior to the easy path of faith. Mill has presented premise 2 as useful for his 
argument, but upon further information, must adjust that claim. He must allow for 
exceptions. There are a set of unstated preconditions that must be true for premise 2 to be 
true. 
 2 becomes: Unless there is something funny, if x is a body of men and x has the 
goal of y, x acts to achieve y with the greatest of ease. Mill is relying on a chain of 
unstated assumptions which make up the unless clause. And by relying on such 
assumptions, by admitting the plausible and fallibilistic into his apparently rigid argument 
he relies on nonmonotonic reasoning.  
 
Prolog representation of 2: 
  Prolog is a simple nonmonotonic logic designed for artificial intelligence and 
computational linguistics programming. While a thorough discussion of its workings is 
beyond the scope of this paper, of particular note is the way that it models conditional 
statements. Using the operator “:”, prolog presents a constructive account of the 
conditional statement. The formula “is_quadriped: is_cat” could be roughly translated “if 
something is a cat, then it is a quadriped.” Prolog is constructive in that you can add 
  28 
antecedents without rewriting the formula. The above formula could be modified to 
“is_quadriped: is_cat, is_dog, not(is_three-legged_cat).” With this new modification, the 
formula has way of modifying claims with greater information.  
  
 Consider a formulation of premise 2 in prolog. 
“Now our experience of human nature justifies us in affirming that whatever is done by a 
body of men is done in the way that which promises to give least trouble.” 
 
With this claim Mill initially presents this conditional: 
act_to_achieve_goals_with_greatest_ease: is_a_body_of_men 
 
However, to make sense of his unexpected conclusion and to avoid calling his audience 
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